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Abstract: 
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a coronavirus capable of 
causing acute respiratory illness.  Laboratory confirmed MERS-CoV cases may be 
asymptomatic, have mild disease or life-threatening infection with a high case fatality rate.  
There are three patterns of transmission: sporadic community cases from presumed non-human 
exposure, family clusters arising from contact with the infected family index case, and 
healthcare-acquired infections among patients and from patients to healthcare workers.  
Healthcare-acquired MERS infection has become a well-known characteristic of the disease and 
a leading means of spread.  Contributing factors foremost to such healthcare-associated 
outbreaks include delayed recognition, inadequate infection control measures, inadequate 
triaging and isolation of suspected MERS or other respiratory illness patients, crowding, and 
patients remaining in the emergency department for many days.  A review of the literature 
suggests effective control of these hospital outbreaks was accomplished in most instances by the 
application of proper infection control procedures. Prompt recognition, isolation, and 
management of suspected cases are key factors for the prevention of the spread of MERS. 
Repeated assessments of infection control and monitoring of corrective measures contribute to 
changing the course of an outbreak. Limiting the number of contacts and hospital visits are also 
important factors to decrease the spread of infection. 
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Introduction: 
The Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a viral infection capable of 
causing acute respiratory infection though its spectrum ranges from asymptomatic laboratory-
confirmed cases, or mild infection to a life-threatening disease with a high case fatality rate [1,2].  
Initially described in 2012 in a 60-year old man hospitalized with suspected community-acquired 
pneumonia developed renal and respiratory failure, ultimately succumbing to progressive disease 
[3].  The first reported healthcare-associated infection was described among multiple facilities in 
Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia [4]. However, a later retrospective analysis of a respiratory outbreak 
occurring in a Jordan public hospital determined that this cluster dated back earlier, becoming 
the first recognized healthcare-associated MERS-CoV infection in April 2012 [5]. The disease 
was also recognized internationally in many countries with secondary transmissions.  The first 
MERS-CoV infection in France caused one secondary transmission among 123 contacts [6].  In a 
study of 51 outbreaks, nosocomial transmissions were observed in 80.4% of the clusters [7].   
Another study found 37.5% of 1797 cases were ascribed to healthcare-associated infections [8].  
The percentage of healthcare workers (HCWs) involved in different outbreaks is variable and 
ranges between 14% and 64% [9].  There seems to be a higher risk of severe disease in people 
with comorbid diseases and older age [8].   
As of March 2018, the WHO reported 2189 laboratory-confirmed cases from 27 countries, 
including 782 (35.7%) deaths [10].  Among the reported cases, peaks occurred in 2014 (due to 
the Jeddah outbreak) and 2015 (South Korea outbreak) (figure 1).   
There are three patterns of MERS-CoV transmission [1]: sporadic community cases from 
presumed non-human exposure [1], family clusters resulting from contact with an infected 
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family index case [11–13], and healthcare-acquired infections between patients and from patients 
to healthcare workers [1,4,5,14–31].    
Though MERS-CoV has a documented ability to transmit between humans, even in healthcare 
settings there does not appear to be sustained human-to-human transmission.  This is likely due 
to the MERS-CoV relatively low reproduction number of 0.8-1.3 [29,30].  The South Korean 
MERS outbreak was thought to have a low reproduction number of 1 % [31].  However, the 
reproduction number was estimated to be as high as 2-5% in some MERS outbreaks in Saudi 
Arabia and South Korea [32].  The upper reproduction estimates were probably derived from 
lack of sufficient infection control measures, and the estimates were lowered with improved 
detection and prevention practices over time.  In this review, we review the available literature 
on healthcare-associated infections and transmission of MERS-CoV to elucidate the contributing 
risk factors.  
Search strategy 
The search was performed according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews 
and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines (http://www.prismastatement.org).  The search 
included MEDLINE and Scopus databases for articles published in English as follows: 
#1: “MERS” OR “MERS-CoV” OR “Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus”  
#2: “Transmission” OR “Outbreak” OR “Healthcare associated infection” OR “Nosocomial” or 
“cluster”; 
#3: #1 AND #2. 
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In addition, we searched the Saudi Ministry of Health website for updates and the World Health 
Organization website and ProMed websites for any listed outbreaks. 
We included published papers written in English if the studies described any healthcare-
associated outbreak and included contributing factors to the outbreak or factors that were used to 
limit and control the spread of the infection. We excluded case reports and reports of clinical 
presentations.  We also excluded outbreaks with no specific descriptions of contributing factors 
to the outbreaks  [10,18,26].  Of the 40 full-text articles assessed for eligibility, 18 articles were 
excluded as these did not describe factors related to outbreaks.  A total of 22 articles were 
included in the final analyses for contributing factors for MERS-CoV outbreaks in healthcare 
settings.  
Timeline of Healthcare-Associated Infections: 
Many healthcare-associated outbreaks have occurred in Saudi Arabia, though a large outbreak 
arose in South Korea in 2015 [1].  A timeline of these outbreaks is shown in figure 2, the most 
recent updated figure from the World Health Organization.  The first outbreak in Saudi Arabia 
occurred in Al-Hasa [4], followed by a significant epidemic in Jeddah in 2014 [14,16].  Other 
outbreaks in 2014 were in King Faisal Specialist Hospital [17], King Fahad Medical City in 
Riyadh [18] and and Al-Madinah Al-Mounawarh [21].  There were no specific factors listed 
contributing to an outbreak at Prince Sultan Military Medical City, Riyadh [18–20].  In 2015, 
there were three outbreaks in Saudi Arabia in three public hospitals in Al-Hasa region [22], King 
Abdulaziz Medical City in Riyadh [23–25], and King Fahad Cardiac Center [26].  A multi-
facility outbreak of MERS-CoV infection occurred in September 2014-January 2015 in Taif, 
Saudi Arabia in four healthcare facilities [27].  
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Observed Infection Control Practices among Various Outbreaks: 
Jordan Hospital Outbreak, April 2012: 
The outbreak in Zarqa, Jordan involved 13 healthcare workers with pneumonia [5].  Following 
the identification of MERS-CoV, specimens from two fatal cases were retrospectively confirmed 
to be MERS-CoV by real-time RT-PCR [5]. Based on serology and PCR testing, the attack rate 
was 10% among potentially exposed healthcare workers [15].  In this outbreak, multiple 
infection control issues were observed and included: absence of physical barriers between 
different beds in intensive care units apart from cloth drapes, lack of isolation and negative 
pressure rooms, and non-adherence to infection control measures [15].  Patients were transferred 
to two other hospitals with no further evidence of intra-hospital transmissions believed due to 
adequate infection control measures in the accepting institutions [15].  
Al-Hasa 2013 Outbreak, April-May 2013: 
The outbreak involved four hospitals with 21 of the 23 cases acquired by person-to-person 
transmission within hemodialysis units, intensive care units, or other in-patient areas [4].  
Contributing factors to this outbreak included the use of aerosol-generating procedures and the 
performance of resuscitations [4].  The outbreak abated by emphasizing primary infection 
control measures: hand hygiene, droplet and contact precautions for febrile patients, testing all 
febrile patients for MERS-CoV, surgical mask use for all patients undergoing hemodialysis, and 
N95 respirators for healthcare workers during aerosol-generating procedures.  Additional 
measures included enhanced environmental cleaning and excluding non-essential staff and 
visitors [4].  A super-spreading event might also have occurred in the Al-Hasa outbreak where 
one patient infected seven secondary cases [4].   
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France Cases, May 2013: 
A French patient contracted MERS-CoV while traveling, requiring hospitalization.  Of the 123 
contacts of this index patient, only one (0.8%) hospitalized patient tested positive and 39 contacts 
of the second patient tested negative [6].  
Abu Dhabi Outbreak, July 2013 
A patient developed community-acquired infection through camel contact, receiving care in two 
different hospitals. Of the 277 healthcare contacts, four (1.4%) had healthcare-associated 
infections.  These four patients were exposed to the index case before the MERS-CoV diagnosis 
and institution of any respiratory protection measures [28].  
Al-Madinah Al-Munawarrah August 24 to September 3, 2013: 
From August 24 to September 3, 2014, 18 cases were linked to one cluster involving 11 
healthcare-associated infections [21]. The outbreak was thought to be secondary to under-
recognition and poor infection control measures [21]. 
Abu Dhabi Outbreak, March–April 2014: 
In this cluster, the index case arose from camel exposure. Only 2 (2.2%) of 90 hospital contacts 
were positive for MERS-CoV [28]. 
Another cluster was traced to a community member who visited an emergency room three times 
and was then subsequently admitted to a regular unit.  Evaluation of 224 contacts identified 15 
(6.7%) positive cases) [28].   
Prince Sultan Military Medical City, March and April 2014 
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Among multiple outbreaks in this hospital, the largest outbreak came from 15 patients acquiring 
infection within the emergency room [20].  The outbreak abated after application of infection 
control measures. 
Jeddah 2014 Outbreak, March 2-May 10, 2014: 
Involving 14 hospitals and more than 200 cases, 60% of infected cases resulted from healthcare-
associated transmission [14,16] [33].  Factors contributing to intra-hospital transmission included 
inadequate separation of suspected MERS patients, crowding, and inconsistent use of infection 
control precautions [33].  There was no triaging or isolation of patients with respiratory illness, 
and patients remained in the emergency department for many days [33].  In addition, 
uncontrolled patient movements, and high visitor traffic also contributed to the spate [23]. 
Taif, Saudi Arabia Outbreak, September 2014-January 2015: 
The outbreak in Taif, Saudi Arabia included four healthcare settings with the largest number 
traced to a hemodialysis unit involving 15 patients [27].  The implicated cause was close spacing 
between patients of less than two meters [27].   
South Korea Outbreak, May-July 2015: 
The most prominent outbreak outside the Arabian Peninsula, about 17,000 contacts were 
quarantined by the summer of 2015 [34].   The index patient had been in contact with 742 people 
between May 11 to 20, 2015 in one hospital, subsequently infecting 28 patients [35].  An 
additional 186 MERS-CoV cases were identified in more than 17 healthcare settings [31,36–39].  
Among the many contributory reasons for MERS-CoV advancing within South Korea included 
healthcare workers unfamiliar with MERS, suboptimal infection prevention and control 
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measures, overcrowded emergency departments,  multi-bed hospital rooms, “medical shopping” 
by patients, presence of visitors to infected  patients, extensive MERS patient movements, and 
the use of aerosol-generating procedures [40–42].  Particularly problematic factors in the South 
Korea outbreak were contributions of overcrowding, medical shopping and super-spreaders 
[1,43,35,40,44,45].  The first case in the Republic of Korea infected 27 secondary cases, and one 
of the secondary patients then infected 24 tertiary cases, and another secondary patient infected 
73 tertiary cases [43].   Another report from South Korea   found 85, 28, 23, 11, and 6 secondary 
cases arising from individual patients with MERS-CoV [40].  A secondary patient was described 
causing 91 tertiary MERS cases of which 39% occurred within the emergency department and 
13% of cases were healthcare workers [45].  Delayed isolation of suspected patients was an 
important factor that contributed to the spread of MERS-CoV. This was higher in super-
spreaders compared to other patients (mean, 6.6 vs. 2.9 days; P = 0.061) [46]. Multi-bedded 
rooms and nebulization treatments may have also contributed to the spread of MERS-CoV in 
South Korea [47].  
King Abdulaziz Medical City in Riyadh in June–August 2015 
One of the largest MERS outbreaks occurred in the King Abdulaziz Medical City, Riyadh.  
Transmission appeared related to care in the emergency department before a MERS suspicion or 
diagnosis, causing  130 cases [23–25].  A major contributing factor was overcrowding in the 
emergency department [48]. 
Jordan Outbreak, August 2015: 
Amman, Jordan during August-October 2015 experienced 16 laboratory-confirmed cases from 
nine hospitals [36].   There were human-to-human transmissions in both cardiac care and 
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intensive care units of two hospitals [36].  Analyzed viral isolates were similar to those recovered 
in  Riyadh except for deletions in open reading frames 4a, though its impact on transmissibility 
or virulence remains unknown [49]. 
Riyadh, June 2016: 
A nosocomial MERS outbreak was reported in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia during 19-22 June 2016. 
This appeared to start with a woman admitted to the vascular surgery ward through the 
emergency room.  Her initial symptoms were not characteristic of MERS-CoV infection.  After 
confirmation of the diagnosis, active screening revealed 24 positive contacts (HCWs = 20), and 
of all contacts, 20 (83.3%) were asymptomatic [50].  
Riyadh June 1-July 3, 2017 Outbreaks: 
The index case was a 47-year-old male who underwent emergency intubation in the emergency 
room.  From 220 contacts, 33 additional cases were identified as positive including 16 HCWs 
[10].   This cluster was linked to a smaller cluster of five cases in another hospital with the 
involvement of three household contacts, one patient contact, and one health-care worker [10].  
A third unrelated outbreak also occurred in Riyadh in June 2017 and involved nine cases, with 
eight HCWs (4 asymptomatic and four had mild disease) [10]. 
Discussion: 
The WHO continues to tally laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV infections.  In the recent 
update from September 2012 to July 2017, there were 2040 cases with health-care facility 
associated infections (40 HCWs, patients, and visitors) representing 31% of cases [10].  The 
initial symptoms of MERS-CoV are non-specific, often thought to be pedestrian respiratory 
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infections and thus may go unnoticed.  Adherence to standard precautions at all times, given the 
unpredictability of MERS-CoV infection, appears to be the critical factor for the prevention of 
transmission in health-care facilities [10].  Additionally, environmental contamination may play 
a role in some transmission of MERS as viral RNA has been detected for up to five days on 
surfaces [36].   
A well-characterized outbreak in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates offers insights into 
important infection control issues.  The overwhelming reason for MERS-CoV spread centered on 
the delayed diagnosis of MERS-CoV as 93% of infected contacts were exposed before the 
patient’s diagnosis.   Also, use of personal protective equipment (PPE) use during care was 
inconsistent among these HCWs, especially during aerosol-generating procedures.   Although 
improved PPE use would benefit, a larger preventative impact would be placing patients 
presenting with respiratory complaints and potential MERS-CoV infection in proper isolation 
with infection control practices until MERS-CoV infection is ruled out using the standard PCR 
diagnostic method.   
Protocols to address such patients in emergency departments or patients developing an 
apparent viral illness while hospitalized for other conditions should include the ability to rapidly 
isolate patients and run laboratory testing which would likely mitigate spread within healthcare 
systems. Proper triaging of patients with acute respiratory illness is a fundamental step towards 
the application of a unified process to deal with such patients as suggested by the World Health 
Organization and the United States Centers for Disease control and preventions [51,52].   Despite 
such advice, not all healthcare systems in regions endemic for MERS-CoV or in non-endemic 
regions caring for a potentially infected traveller follow these steps.  In a simulation of a 
“mystery” infectious patient, 95 drills including 42 drills specifically for patients with possible 
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MERS were conducted in 49 emergency departments in New York City, USA. Hospitals were 
variable in the identification of potentially infectious patients and implementation of appropriate 
infection control measures such as suboptimal adherence to hand hygiene, PPE use and isolation 
signage posting [53].   
The Saudi Ministry of Health had recently introduced visual triage using a scoring system 
to aid in the assessment of patients presenting with respiratory symptoms in emergency 
departments, dialysis units, and other clinical settings [54].  Also, the Saudi Ministry of Health 
had developed a rapid response team that visits hospitals upon the identification of any positive 
MERS cases to help streamline contact tracing and implementation of infection control 
measures[55].  A similar rapid response team was also formed following the MERS outbreak in 
South Korea [56].   An interesting observation of the outbreaks of MERS-CoV infection is the 
variability of the intra-hospital transmission of the virus.  The South Korea and Jeddah outbreaks 
witnessed patients causing significant spread of secondary cases while in others the index patient 
resulted in few secondary cases despite lack of infection control practices [1].  One reason may 
lie with prolonged viral shedding, observed more commonly in patients with multiple 
comorbidities [1].   One study found that 30% of contacts and 76% of cases were still positive 
for MERS-CoV by PCR 12 days from initial positive samples [57].  A case report showed that a 
healthcare worker shed MERS-COV for about 42 days after initial sampling for diagnosis [58].  
Whether viral detection by molecular methods always equates with an infectious risk remains 
unclear.  An additional factor likely rests in patient movements.  Intra-hospital and inter-hospital 
transmission were documented arising from patient movements within and between hospitals [4] 
[42,45].  Control of patient flow within and between healthcare settings with proper infection 
prevention measures is necessary to decrease the chance of transmission of MERS-CoV.     
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How much asymptomatic and mildly symptomatic patients contribute to viral 
dissemination in the healthcare setting is not clear.  Studies have found variable percentages of  
asymptomatic individuals from 7-66% [10][59] [23,24] [33] [16] [59]Data from South Korea 
showed that none of 82 contacts of an asymptomatic carrier was positive [60], and data showed 
that transmission occurred from asymptomatic  individuals [11,61] [62].   These differences do 
not yet have defined answers for variability in intra-hospital transmission; however, they do 
highlight the need to review and refine infection control practices to help prevent the spread of 
infection within healthcare settings and prevent unwitting spread especially by asymptomatic 
individuals by screening healthcare worker contacts by PCR.   
What is the contribution of the persistence of the MERS-CoV virus in the environment to 
the spread of the virus?  As an RNA virus, MERS-CoV survives surprisingly well on surfaces 
and in the air especially at low temperature and low humidity [63].  Sixty minutes after 
aerosolization, the virus remains infectious at 63.5% at 25 °C and 79% humidity compared to 
only 4.7% at conditions of 38 °C and 24% humidity [64].  Up to day 18-27 after symptom onset, 
MERS-CoV was detected by RT-PCR and viral culture from most of the touchable environments 
in patients rooms [65].   Bed controller devices and thermometers were PCR positive until five 
days after the last positive PCR result from the patient’s respiratory specimen [65].  MERS-CoV 
was cultured in 4 of 7 air samples from patients' rooms, restroom, and common corridor and 
from 15 (22%) of 68 surface swabs [37].  The MERS-CoV RNA was detected from anterooms, 
medical devices, air-ventilating equipment, bed sheets, bed rails, IV fluid hangers, and X-ray 
devices [66].  These data suggest that environmental cleaning needs to be meticulous and that 
laboratory data may be required to prove adequate disinfection to allow discontinuation of 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
14 
 
isolation procedures.  Further studies are required to assess infectious risks of the environment in 
the presence of molecularly detected MERS-CoV RNA. 
The prospect for control of MERS-CoV relies on multi-faceted programs to educate 
HCWs on the disease, to identify potential patients early in their course of illnesses, to isolate 
suspected and confirmed cases appropriately, and to implement proper infection control.  The 
best prospect for MERS prevention and control rests in basic principles of infection prevention 
and control in the healthcare settings.  Balkhy argues that three pillars are necessary: policies and 
procedures, facility and human resources, and accountability and leadership [67,68].  How these 
goals could be achieved is partly found in one study using a core group of nurses for an 
education program consisting of an online skill module, donning and doffing of personal 
protective equipment, and hands-on practice to obtain nasopharyngeal swabs [69]. Another study 
called for the use of the “3Is“ (Identify-Isolate-Inform) tool in the emergency room to rapidly 
identify and isolate suspected cases with any emerging infectious disease [70].   
 
Table 2 provides a summary of potential concerns in infection prevention and control to 
halt MERS-CoV transmission with appropriate interventions.  Some listed items are by nature 
parochial including facility structure, knowledge and skills of HCWs, and patient-related issues.  
These can be individualized incorporating strategies that include education, feedback, and 
tackling facility related issues [71].  In a survey of 607 HCWs, hospital infrastructure and design, 
staffing shortfalls, and absence of infection control training were cited as the primary 
contributing factors for the spread of MERS-CoV infection in healthcare facilities [72].   In a 
study from Saudi Arabia of 228 trainees, half of the respondents indicated that their hospital had 
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a clear plan while 28%  did not feel they were well prepared for MERS [73].  A targeted 
educational strategy increased HCWs knowledge, skills and attitudes in Saudi Arabia private 
hospitals [74].  Raising public awareness and recognition of the disease will also assist in 
preventing transmission [75]. 
MERS-CoV presents with a variety of clinical and laboratory findings [4,13,76].  There 
are notable challenges in diagnosis through laboratory and radiological methods, including the 
possibility of negative swab results by PCR methodology.  Currently, the diagnosis of MERS-
CoV infection best relies on viral detection by real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain 
reaction (PCR) methodology [76–78]. Lower respiratory samples had been shown to yield better 
diagnostic results than nasal or oral swabs.  In two studies, lower respiratory samples showed 
higher Ct values than upper respiratory samples and MERS-CoV virus was detected later in the 
course of the disease [77,79].  The WHO recommends that both upper and lower respiratory tract 
specimens be collected whenever possible [80].  Improved diagnostic tools are needed for early 
diagnosis of the disease.   
In conclusion, MERS-CoV like SARS requires leadership insisting on formal and 
continued training of HCWs to be sufficiently prepared for emerging respiratory infectious 
diseases.  Hospitals have varied in their ability to identify correctly potentially infectious patients 
and quickly implement appropriate infection control measures [53].  Prompt recognition, 
isolation, and management of the suspected cases are vital factors for the prevention of MERS 
transmission.  It has been shown that MERS‐CoV nucleic acid was detected by PCR in serum, 
feces and urine [81–85].  Thus, it is important to maintain proper infection control practices 
when caring for those patients. 
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 Repeated assessments of infection control and monitoring implementation of corrective 
measures leading to constant readiness will change the course of an outbreak or halt it before it 
starts [86].  Limiting the number of contacts and hospital visits are also important factors to 
decrease the spread of infection [87].  Healthcare facilities should take all the steps to learn from 
past experiences and build capacities for the prevention of outbreaks such as MERS, SARS, and 
Ebola.  Healthcare leadership and workers should strive to prevent future outbreaks.  Failure to 
do so would mean that lessons learned from SARS, MERS and Ebola would be relegated to 
history--leaving patients, hospitals and HCWs vulnerable.  Many infection control questions 
remain requiring further research, including a better understanding of the disease dynamics.  
Leading concerns include the role of asymptomatic individuals in the transmission of the disease 
and precise risk factors for the transmission in the healthcare.  Although data accrued has 
concentrated on respiratory transmission, the role of other body fluids and the built environment 
in transmission remains unknown. As zoonotic reservoirs for MERS-CoV may continue to 
produce sporadic human infections, rigorous infection control practices should prevent the virus 
from spreading past the hospital door  
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Table 1: Contributing factors to the hospital outbreaks 
Infection control issues Examples number of 
instances 
where this was 
an issue 
Involved Hospitals Reference 
Hospital Design absence of  physical barriers between 
different beds, inadequate separation 
of suspected MERS patients, lack of 
isolation and negative pressure rooms  
3 Jordan, Jeddah, Taif [5,14,16,27,33,88] 
Healthcare Workers 
Adherence 
Sub-optimal adherence to infection 
control measures 
4 Jordan, Al-Madinah 
Al-Muwnawarah, 
Jeddah, Riyadh 
[5,14,16,21,23–
25,33,88] 
 Contacts prior to MERS diagnosis and 
under-recognition 
1 Abu Dhabi [28] 
 contact without respiratory protection 1 Abu Dhabi [28] 
 Overcrowding 2 South Korea,   
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[1,14,16,33,35,36,
40–45,88] 
Patients flow No triaging and isolation of patients 
with respiratory illness, patients 
remained in the emergency room for 
many days, use of multi-bed rooms, 
extensive patients movements, 
2 South Korea,  [1,14,16,33,35,36,
40–45,88] 
 Unfamiliarity with MERS infection  1 South Korea [1,43,35,36,40–
42,44,45] 
 Under-recognition 2 Al-Madinah Al-
Muwnawarah 
[10,21,50] 
Aerosol generating 
procedures 
use of CPAP and nebulized 
medications and the performance of 
resuscitations 
3 South Korea, Al-Hasa [1,4,10,35,36,40–
45] 
Patients’ characteristics Contribution of super-spreaders 1 South Korea [1,43,35,36,40–
42,44,45] 
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Social Norms “medical shopping”, presence of 
multiple friends and family members 
with patients 
1 South Korea [1,43,35,36,40–
42,44,45] 
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Table 2: A Summary of Highlights of Areas for Concern and Possible Interventions to Control MERS Infection  
 
Infection Control Domain Infection control issues Suggested Interventions 
Environmental Absent physical barriers between 
beds, inadequate isolation of 
suspected MERS patients  
Establish respiratory triage areas, adequate 
isolation of suspected patients: Contact and 
airborne  
 Lack of isolation and negative 
pressure rooms 
Build capacity to accommodate increasing 
number of patients with respiratory illness 
System Unfamiliarity and under-
recognition  of MERS infection    
Education and periodic review of MERS 
case definitions 
 Insufficient compliance with 
infection control measures 
Strengthening education, compliance 
monitoring and feedback  
 Aerosol generating procedures Include training of HCWs on how to protect 
themselves during these procedures and to 
carry them in an airborne infection isolation 
room 
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Personal Presence of multiple friends and 
family members with patients 
Limiting visitors to suspected and confirmed 
cases until patients are no longer infectious 
 “Medical Shopping” Education of the public on the risk of 
exposure to multiple medical venues 
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Figure 1: A flow diagram of the search strategy according to the Preferred Reporting Items for 
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA)  guidelines [89] 
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Figure 2: Most Recent Updated Figure of Timeline of Reported MERS-CoV Cases to the World Health Organization 
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Figure 3: Timeline of Major Healthcare Associated Outbreaks  
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